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consequences. For instance, glocalization a` la
Chander favors large companies that can afford to
tailor their activities to each separate local market.
Google can do it, but for the new start-up just put
together in Bangalore, this endeavor is costly. In
other words, applying the law of the service recip-
ients may protect the consumers, but it raises new
and high barriers of entry into the global market,
favoring incumbent global companies, which are
in most cases situated in developed countries. A
related side effect is that the combination of the
global economy and Chander’s proposed glocal-
ization principle incentivizes service providers to
tailor their services to the laws and mores of the
country of destination, often neglecting their own
locality. For example, think of an Israeli start-up
that develops a sophisticated filtering technology
meant to prevent children from accessing pornog-
raphy. The designers of the technology embed
their understanding of the definition of pornogra-
phy in the country where they intend to market
their product. The designers in Kfar Saba in Israel
maywell attempt to imagine the community stan-
dards in, for example, faraway places like Alabama
or California.12 The local Israeli market is simply
too small to bother about. Parents in liberal Tel
Aviv will be offered the same filters, with its
embedded values, as those in the more conserva-
tive U.S. Bible Belt, or perhaps the more permis-
sive U.S. West Coast. In other words, complying
with a foreign law might be at the expense of the
local community. What matters is the size of the
markets in the areas of the importer and exporter
of information services.
Chander beautifully weaves together theory,
practice, trade, culture, andpolitics into a complex
yet clear argument, a sophisticated yet down-to-
earth analysis, and a beautifully written text.
While glocalization and harmonization are not
perfect, the alternatives, asChander elaborates, are
probably worse. His discussion and arguments are
timely and crucial for enabling a better global elec-
tronic environment. The book is a highly impor-
tant contribution to the discussion about interna-
tional trade, globalization studies, and the
ongoing debate about the role of the law in a
dynamic technological setting. Chander paves a
new path in all these discourses. His analysis is
informedby international law and conflict of laws,
together with a deep understanding of the impli-
cations of globalization.He constantly reminds us
of the human face of the net-work—touse the glo-
balization studies lingo—andhe is keenly sensitive
to the human rights aspects of the topic at stake.
The Electronic Silk Road opens up a new set of
issues with which the global or local “we” are
bound to engage in the near future.
MICHAEL BIRNHACK
Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University
BOOK REVIEWS
Taming Globalization: International Law, the U.S.
Constitution, and the New World Order. By
Julian Ku and John Yoo. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. viii, 272.
Index. $35.
According to Julian Ku of Hofstra University
School of Law and John Yoo of the University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law, globalization
poses a significant threat to theU.S. constitutional
system of governance. In their recent book, Tam-
ingGlobalization: InternationalLaw, theU.S.Con-
stitution, and the New World Order, they seek to
reassure readers that this threat can be deflected. If
their prescriptions are followed, Ku and Yoo
argue, the United States can avoid constitutional
problems while continuing to reap the benefits of
international cooperation. Ku and Yoo insist
that they are neither trying to stop globalization
(a hopeless endeavor in any event) nor categori-
cally opposed to the international community’s
efforts to regulate globalization’s effects. Instead,
their approach is “accommodationist” (p. 13);
they offer three proposals to alleviate the “ten-
sion” between international governance and the
U.S. Constitution (p. 2). First, U.S. courts
should presume that treaties are not self-executing
12 U.S. courts follow a three-prong test to define
obscene material, which is not protected by the First
Amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). The first prong is whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pru-
rient interest. Id. at 30–31.
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and should enforce them only if Congress has
adopted implementing legislation. Second, cus-
tomary international law (CIL) should have the
status of federal law only if Congress has adopted
legislation implementing the CIL norm. In the
absence of such legislation, Congress and the
courts should defer to both presidential interpre-
tations of CIL and presidential decisions about
compliance with CIL. Third, individual U.S.
states ought to have more autonomy in deciding
whether andhow to implement international obli-
gations, especially those that affect traditional
state interests.
Taking the position that academics have
“battled to a stalemate” about whether these pro-
posals are constitutionally required (p. 11), Ku
and Yoo seek, instead, to defend them on func-
tional grounds—that is, on the basis of their
consequences for democracy and foreign-policy
decision making within the United States. As
explainedbelow, the authors’ functional analysis is
curiously truncated. Adopting their proposals
wouldmake it harder for theUnited States to real-
ize the benefits of international cooperation. Ku
and Yoo ignore this consequence in their func-
tional analysis, an omission that is particularly
strange given the authors’ acknowledgment that
these benefits can be substantial.
When the omitted costs of Ku and Yoo’s pro-
posals are added back into the equation, it
becomes clear that, despite their assurances, Ku
andYoo are not actually offering a prescription for
“how the American constitutional system can
embrace the intensive levels of cooperation
required to tackle global problems” (p. 254).
Instead, they are offering a prescription for ham-
pering international cooperation in the service of
a contested view of what the U.S. Constitution
requires.
HowexactlydoKuandYoo frame theproblems
that their proposals would alleviate? In their view,
globalization and global governance render two
aspects of the U.S. constitutional order particu-
larly vulnerable: federalism and the separation of
powers. Federalism is imperiled because interna-
tional agreements increasingly regulate subjects
that used to be within individual U.S. states’ con-
trol. As examples, Ku and Yoo cite not only
human rights treaties but also treaties that govern
wills and child custody. Separation of powers is
threatened, in their view, by international regula-
tory responses that delegate authority away from
Congress and the president to international insti-
tutions (p. 16). The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) exemplifies this concern.
Under NAFTA, duties on goods from Canada or
Mexico can be challenged only before binational
arbitration panels, and the decisions of those pan-
els cannot be appealed to any U.S. institution.1
For this reason, Ku and Yoo maintain, NAFTA
effects a “complete” transfer of “a sovereignpower
of theUnited States (the power to impose customs
duties on imports)” to an international institution
(p. 31).
Ku and Yoo hope to safeguard more than just
federalism and the separation of powers, however.
Their functional analysis specifies four additional
goals. They seek to enhance democracy—“that is,
a cluster of values, including popular representa-
tion, accountability, transparency, and delibera-
tion, among others” (p. 104). They also want to
ensure that U.S. foreign-policy decisions are
coherent (that is, the United States speaks with
one voice), well-informed (that is, based on com-
prehensive information that is collected and ana-
lyzed by foreign-relations experts), and nimble
enough to keep pace with world events. Ku and
Yoo build a functional case for their three propos-
als by comparing how well different branches of
the federal and state governments are able to serve
these four goals. The authors acknowledge that
they “necessarily base [their] institutional assess-
ment on certain generalizations and assumptions
about how these institutions work, because it
would be difficult to conduct a sufficiently rigor-
ous empirical test of these functional claims”
(p. 127).
In making the case for their first proposal, Ku
and Yoo argue that non-self-execution enhances
political accountability and deliberation by
involving the House of Representatives in treaty
implementation. The House is designed to be
especially responsive to the electorate’s demands
1 North American Free Trade Agreement,, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., Art. 1904(11), Dec. 8, 1992, 32 ILM 605,
683 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2014] 569RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
and includes members who hold a wide range of
policy views. Requiring its participation in treaty
implementation will “encourage the production
of information, cause viewpoints on the extreme
ends of legislator preferences to confront more
moderate views, and result in the giving of public
justifications and reasons for decisions” (p. 208).
At the same time, non-self-execution prevents the
courts—the most politically insulated branch of
the federal government—from taking any steps at
all to enforce treaties unless and until Congress as
a whole has acted. The political branches’ superior
ability to collect and assess information supports
this allocation of roles, Ku and Yoo argue. They
claim that the need for timely policymaking does
too, although their assertion that “Congress can
enact nationwide rules more quickly than the
courts” (p. 109) is certainly contestable.
Ku and Yoo undertake a similar analysis to jus-
tify their proposal regarding CIL. They maintain
that the United States will be able to pursue its
foreign-policy goalsmore effectively if compliance
with CIL is discretionary rather than mandatory,
at least whenCongress has not adopted legislation
requiring compliance. Based on a comparative
institutional analysis, Ku and Yoo argue that the
executive branch is better suited than the courts to
decide when compliance is a wise policy choice for
the following reasons. The executive branch is
more politically accountable than the courts and
has a greater capacity to collect and analyze rele-
vant information. The executive branch can also
reach a decision and can deploy other foreign-pol-
icy tools to support whatever decision it makes
regarding CIL.
These first two proposals have been much
debated in the academic literature. Ku and Yoo’s
third proposal—enhancing the role of state gov-
ernments in implementing international norms—
is more novel: they describe it as “perhaps [the]
most radical” of the three (p. 14).To shore up state
autonomy, Ku and Yoo encourage the federal
political branches to exercise two kinds of self-re-
straint. First, they endorse reservations to preclude
the United States from taking on new interna-
tional obligations that affect matters that are tra-
ditionally governed by state law, including crim-
inal law, public morals, contracts, torts, property,
trusts and estates, and family law. In the absence of
international obligations, Congress has no reason
and no authority under the U.S. Constitution to
displace state laws on these subjects. Second,
where the United States does enter into treaties
that address matters that have traditionally been
regulated by states, the authors encourage the fed-
eral government to forgo implementing legisla-
tion. Instead, they encourage relyingon individual
U.S. states to implement the United States’ treaty
obligations. Finally, Ku and Yoo emphasize that
any decision to preempt state laws ought to be
made by the political branches rather than the
courts.
Ku and Yoo justify their third proposal on the
grounds that the U.S. state political branches not
only surpass the federal courts in foreign-policy
competence but sometimes even surpass the fed-
eral political branches. In particular, they describe
theU.S. states’ expertise and access to information
in those areas of law and policy within their tradi-
tional control as superior. Ku and Yoo concede
that the U.S. states are less capable of achieving a
uniform and coherent foreign policy. But Ku and
Yoo are untroubled by this prospect: in their
view, maintaining U.S. state autonomy will often
bemore important than ensuring either coherence
or compliance with international obligations
(p. 165).
The authors frame their functional analysis as
addressing the question of who decides whether
the United States will comply with its interna-
tional obligations rather than whether the United
States should comply (p. 92). But their proposals
are not neutral when it comes to the question of
whether to comply. Every one of their recommen-
dations reduces the probability that the United
States will comply with its international obliga-
tions. Ku and Yoo’s first two proposals would ren-
der the courts unavailable to ensure compliance in
the absence of congressional legislation. Similarly,
if theUnited States relies exclusively on its states to
implement its international obligations, the prob-
ability is high that at least one state would decline
to do so, thereby putting the United States in
breach of its obligations.
Nor are Ku and Yoo’s proposals neutral on the
question of whether the United States should
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participate in international efforts either to secure
the benefits of globalization or to mitigate its
harms. A presumption of non-self-execution is
especially likely to impede U.S. participation.2
To avoid violating its international obligations,
the United States generally does not ratify non-
self-executing treaties unless and until imple-
menting legislation is in place.3 Enacting imple-
menting legislation is not easy; many treaties that
have been approved by the Senate remain un-
ratified because Congress has not approved im-
plementing legislation.4 The more that treaties
require implementing legislation, themore signif-
icant this roadblock becomes.
A set of proposals that encumber the United
States’ ability to secure the benefits of interna-
tional cooperation might be justified on func-
tional grounds if those benefitswere trivial or non-
existent. But at no point do Ku and Yoo suggest
that the benefits of international cooperation are
so trivial that they can be ignored.
To the contrary, the authors acknowledge that
successful international cooperation can and does
yield substantial benefits. Indeed, they appreciate
that some problems, such as transboundary pollu-
tion or chemical weapons, can only be solved
through international cooperation (pp. 52, 253–
54). At one point, Ku and Yoo even invoke the
developmentof the administrative state during the
New Deal to explain the appeal of international
regulation and international institutions. “As the
scope of economic activity had become national,”
Ku and Yoo observe, “effective government regu-
lation had to extend its reach to keep pace” (p. 61).
Simultaneously, “government institutions had to
change inorder to come to gripswith the complex-
ity and speed of the new markets” (p. 62), and so
Congress began delegating regulatory authority to
administrative agencies. As the scope of economic
andother interactions becomes global, the authors
acknowledge, a parallel dynamic drives the devel-
opment of international regulations and interna-
tional institutions (pp. 28, 63–64).
Since the benefits of international cooperation
are substantial, as Ku and Yoo recognize, a com-
plete functional analysis would need to explain
why the authors’ proposals remain desirable even
though theymake these benefits harder to realize.5
It is not obvious how this functional analysis
would come out: there is no common currency for
2 Ku and Yoo acknowledge this consequence: “It is
true that non-self-execution raises the transaction costs
of making international agreements with domestic
effect” (p. 107). And they further note: “It seems unde-
niable that following the basic forms of domestic law-
making—congressional control over legislation, presi-
dential leadership in interpretation, or maintaining
the interstitial nature of federal law against a back-
ground of state lawmaking—creates more arduous
requirements for creating international law and organi-
zations” (p. 258). But their functional analysis disre-
gards these costs entirely.
3 Robert E. Dalton, United States, in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 765, 789 (Duncan B.
Hollis, Merritt R. Blakeslee & L. Benjamin Ederington
eds., 2005).
4 E.g., Convention Providing a Uniform Law on
the Form of an International Will, Oct. 26, 1973,
S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-29 (1986), 12 ILM 1298
(1973), available at http://www.unidroit.org/
instruments/succession [hereinafter Washington Con-
vention]; Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 UNTS 57, 28 ILM 657
(1989); Kristina Daugirdas & Julian DavisMortenson,
Contemporary Practice of theUnited States Relating to
International Law, 108 AJIL 532, 533 (2014); see also
OonaA.Hathaway,Treaties’ End:ThePast, Present, and
Future of International Lawmaking in the United States,
117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1313 n.225 (2008); STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 106TH CONG.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE
20 (Comm. Print 2001), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-
106SPRT66922.pdf (“Treaties approved by the Senate
have sometimes remained unfulfilled for long periods
because implementing legislation was not passed.”).
5 In their conclusion, Ku and Yoo briefly suggest that
their proposals may facilitate international cooperation
by making the United States’ international commit-
ments more credible and sustainable by involving more
political actors (specifically Congress and state govern-
ments) in implementing the U.S. obligations. Ku and
Yoo’s proposals are at best only partially aimed at mak-
ing the United States’ international obligations harder
to breach, however. Their proposals regarding CIL and
state autonomy facilitate violations of international law,
rather than deter them. Moreover, it is not clear that a
non-self-executing treaty coupled with implementing
legislation is harder to breach than a self-executing
treaty. Because of the last-in-time rule, ordinary legisla-
tion can override both kinds of treaties.
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comparing the benefits of international coopera-
tion against the benefits of state autonomyor addi-
tional deliberation by Congress. But Ku and Yoo
cannot dodge the inquiry while sustaining the
claim that a functional analysis favors their pro-
posals.
The authors’ comparison to the New Deal re-
inforces this point. The important question, they
argue, is whether the New Deal “effectively
responded to the nationalization of the economy
and society with regulation of similar scope. It
seems apparent that it did” (p. 63).Had the federal
government been unable to adopt national regula-
tion and delegate to administrative agencies, it is
difficult to see how the federal government could
have achieved a comparably effective response.
Any functional analysis of alternative constitu-
tional rules regarding theCommerceClause or the
nondelegation doctrine would have to account for
the (in)ability of the United States to respond
effectively to the economic and societal changes
that the country faced in the early decades of the
twentieth century.
Returning to the international context, con-
sider two examples that Ku and Yoo address at
some length. The first involves the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations6 (VCCR) and the
fallout of the Supreme Court’s well-known deci-
sion in Medellı´n v. Texas.7 Jose´ Medellı´n was a
Mexican national whowas arrested and ultimately
convicted in the Texas state courts of raping and
murdering two teenage girls. TheVCCRprovides
that when foreign nationals like Medellı´n are
arrested or detained they shall be informed of their
rights to communicate with a consular official.8
Like many foreign nationals arrested and later
convicted in U.S. courts, Medellı´n was not so
informed. The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) issued a series of decisions related to the
United States’ obligations under the VCCR, ulti-
mately concluding in the Avena case that the
United States had an obligation to provide review
and reconsideration to ascertain whether the
VCCR violations caused actual prejudice to each
individual defendant.9 In a decision that Ku and
Yoo applaud, the SupremeCourt held inMedellı´n
that the Avena decision was not self-executing.10
The government’s brief in Medellı´n explicitly
stated that President George W. Bush had deter-
mined that compliance with the ICJ decision was
in the United States’ interests.11 Bush therefore
sought to comply with the ICJ’s decision by issu-
ing a memorandum to the attorney general assert-
ing that “the United States will discharge its inter-
national obligations . . . by having state courts
give effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordancewith
general principles of comity . . . .”12 The Supreme
Court held, however, that the president lacked
authority to require the Texas courts to comply
with the ICJ’s decision.13 Texas state officials were
unmoved by arguments that they should imple-
ment the ICJ’s judgment, and Medellı´n was exe-
cuted without receiving the review and reconsid-
eration that the United States was obliged to
provide.
Whether Medellı´n was rightly or wrongly de-
cided, it is undeniable that the decision makes it
harder for the United States to comply with its
international obligations—and thus makes it
harder to secure the benefits of international coop-
eration. On January 22, 2014, the state of Texas
executed Edgar Arias Tamayo, another Mexican
national whowas not notified of his rights to com-
municate with a consular official when he was
arrested.14 AU.S.Department of State spokesper-
son thereafter emphasized that the benefits that
6 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
Apr. 24, 1963, 21UST77, 596UNTS261 [hereinafter
VCCR].
7 Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); see also
Agora: Medellı´n, 102 AJIL 529 (2008).
8 VCCR, supra note 6, Art. 36.
9 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 ICJ REP. 12 (Mar. 31).
10 Medellı´n, 552 U.S. at 532.
11 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 8–9, Medellı´n v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984), available at http://
www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2006/2pet/5ami/2006-
0984.pet.ami.pdf.
12 Id. at 5.
13 Medellı´n, 552 U.S. at 532.
14 SeeKristinaDaugirdas& JulianDavisMortenson,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 108 AJIL
322, 324 (2014).
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theUnited States derives from international coop-
erationwere threatened: “TheUnitedStates’ com-
pliance with our international obligations under
Avena is critical to our ability to ensure consular
access and assistance for our own citizens who are
arrested or detained by foreign governments, as
well as to maintain cooperation from foreign gov-
ernments on abroad range of law enforcement and
other issues.”15
How should we weigh the United States’
reduced ability to protect its citizens abroad
against the benefits that Ku and Yoo identify with
non-self-execution? The authors do not say. They
do acknowledge that non-self-execution has some
costs, although they downplay them and suggest
that these costs are not very high in the consular-
notification context.16 But in an era where Con-
gress is often deadlocked and unable to pass legis-
lation of any kind, these costs are significant. They
threaten to convert a presumption of non-self-
execution into a presumption of noncompliance
with international obligations, even for treaties to
which two thirds of the Senate have already con-
sented.
The consular-notification issue also under-
scores that Ku and Yoo are not even clear about
how the different goals that they consider in their
functional analysis should be traded off against
one another. Their case for non-self-execution
compares how well the executive and legislative
branches advance the goals of enhancing democ-
racy and generating coherent, well-informed, and
nimble foreign policy to how well the courts
would do so. The comparative institutional anal-
ysis is easy for Ku and Yoo because, they argue, the
political branches surpass the courts in furthering
each of the authors’ goals. But how would the
analysis compare the executive branch alone to
the political branches together? Medellı´n’s rejec-
tion of the U.S. president’s efforts to achieve
compliance with the VCCR by memorandum
raises exactly this question. Would Ku and Yoo’s
functional analysis endorse the president’s ability
to unilaterally achieve compliance? The executive
branch alone would fare better along the dimen-
sions of coherence and speed. The two political
branches together would provide more delib-
eration and, perhaps, more political account-
ability on the issue of implementation. Both the
executive branch alone and the political branches
together could generate decisions that are in-
formed by expertise. Ku and Yoo provide no guid-
ance about how to weigh these considerations
against each other and do not reveal which out-
come their functional analysis would favor.
The authors’ divergent proposals for treaties
and CIL raise the same question. Ku and Yoo
maintain that the president should have discretion
to implementCILonhis own, unlessCongress has
adopted legislation that sets a policy requiring (or
prohibiting) such compliance. On their func-
tional account, why should the president not have
comparable authority to implement treaty obli-
gations—including those at issue in Medellı´n?
Indeed, promoting deliberation is arguably less
important for treaties than CIL because two
thirds of the Senate have explicitly consented to
the former.
Now consider a second example—one that has
received considerably less attention than the con-
sular notification issue—the Convention Provid-
ing a Uniform Law on the Form of an Interna-
tional Will (Washington Convention).17 Ku and
Yoo cite theWashington Convention to illustrate
the kind of U.S. state autonomy that they hope
to promote. But the Washington Convention is
unusual along several dimensions, and these
unusual features preclude it from providing
meaningful support for general propositions
about how to reconcile globalization with U.S.
state autonomy.
A bit of background information is needed to
understand why. One feature of globalization is
the increasing likelihood that a personwill live and
accumulate property in two or more countries
15 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Statement, Execution of
Mexican National Edgar Arias Tamayo, Statement
of Marie Harf, Deputy Department Spokesperson
( Jan. 23, 2014), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2014/01/220546.htm.
16 As Ku and Yoo note, “Deliberation also has its
potential costs, including delay in decision, but the con-
text of setting domestic rules of general application on
questions such as criminal procedure may not incur
high costs in this area” (p. 208). 17 Washington Convention, supra note 4.
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during her lifetime as a result of travel, immigra-
tion, temporary work abroad, or retirement to a
foreign country. This trend, in turn, increases the
likelihood that the personwill execute awill in one
country and then die in another.18 The Washing-
ton Convention addresses that eventuality. It
establishes a new type of will—an “international
will”—with specified formal criteria. The Wash-
ington Convention allows individuals to execute
wills that will be recognized as valid as to form by
other parties to the agreement.19 Because U.S.
states have traditionally regulatedprobatematters,
the Washington Convention triggers Ku and
Yoo’s concerns about eroding federalism.
The United States signed the Washington
Convention in 1973. A number of U.S. states
subsequently adopted legislation to implement
the Convention and establish the possibility of
executing an “international will” consistent with
the Convention. According to Ku and Yoo, these
individual states have “essentially decided to enter
into the Washington Convention themselves
through their enactmentof law implementing that
convention” (p. 172).Thus, the authors claim that
the Washington Convention “illustrates how
states can play a central role in the fulfillment of
international obligations” (p. 173).
But the Washington Convention is not an
example of relying on states to fulfill international
obligations because the United States has no
obligations under the Washington Convention:
the United States is not a party. When President
Ronald Reagan submitted the Washington Con-
vention to the Senate for its advice and consent, he
set out a bifurcated plan for its implementation.20
Individual U.S. states could choose whether to
make the benefits of theWashington Convention
available to their own residents: they would not be
required to do so. But all U.S. states would be
obliged to recognize the formal validity of interna-
tional wills, whether or not they chose to adopt
legislation permitting their own citizens to make
international wills. Although the Senate con-
sented to ratification in 1991,21 Congress has not
adopted such legislation. And in the absence of
such legislation, the executive branch did not rat-
ify the Convention—presumably because it
judged the risk of noncompliance with the
United States’ obligations to be intolerably high.
The only reason that individual U.S. states can
still secure the benefits of the Washington Con-
vention for their own residents is that the Wash-
ington Convention is drafted in a very atypical
way. Most treaties reflect a quid pro quo and
make their benefits available only to parties. But
the benefits of the Washington Convention do
not depend on reciprocity. Instead, the Washing-
ton Convention requires parties to recognize all
wills that meet the Convention’s criteria.22 This
feature is the one that allows individual states to
provide their residents the option of writing inter-
national wills that will be recognized as valid by
parties to the Washington Convention without
the United States itself being a party. To put it
mildly, this peculiarity makes the Washington
Convention a poor example for establishing the
benefits of the authors’ proposal for reconciling
international cooperation and federalism.
The Washington Convention model is limited
in still another way: the benefit that theWashing-
ton Convention confers is not a public good. We
can give residents ofMontana the option of draft-
ing an international will without automatically
providing that option to residents of Vermont.
That is not the case when the benefit that a treaty
confers is an intact ozone layer or a world that is
free from chemical weapons. Indeed, Ku and Yoo
acknowledge that achieving the goals of the
Chemical Weapons Convention,23 for example,
18 John G. Sprankling, The Emergence of Interna-
tional Property Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 461, 483–84
(2012).
19 Washington Convention, supra note 4.
20 See Letter of Transmittal, Convention Providing
a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will,
S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-29, 1973 UST LEXIS 321
( July 2, 1986), available at http://www.cabinetchone.
com/message.
21 137CONG.REC. S12131 (daily ed.Aug. 2, 1991).
22 WashingtonConvention, supranote 4, Art. I(1)&
Annex Art. 1 (noting that “[a] will shall be valid as
regards form, irrespective particularly of the placewhere
it is made, of the location of the assets and of the nation-
ality, domicile or residence of the testator, if it is made
in the form of an international will complying with the
provisions set out in Articles 2 to 5 hereinafter”).
23 Convention on the Prohibition, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
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requires uniform implementation.Relyingwholly
on states to implement international obligations
will, in almost every case, put the benefits of inter-
national cooperation beyond the reach of not only
individual U.S. states but also the United States as
a whole.
Ku and Yoo’s three marquee proposals are thus
more costly and less advantageous than the
authors acknowledge. The book leaves the reader
uncertain about one final point: whether the
authors themselves view their three proposals as
sufficient to remedy globalizations’ threats to the
American constitutional order. There are some
suggestions that the three proposals are only the
least controversial part of a more radical package.
Recall the NAFTA dispute settlement provi-
sions that Ku and Yoo invoke to illustrate the
threat that globalization poses to separation of
powers.24 How would NAFTA—or U.S. law
relating to NAFTA—change if Ku and Yoo’s
three proposals were implemented? The answer
appears to be not at all. Ku and Yoo’s proposals
regardingCIL and state autonomydo not apply to
NAFTA. The presumption against self-execution
would not change anything either. NAFTA was
never considered to be self-executing; Congress
approved NAFTA and adopted implementing
legislation in a single action. That legislation
included a provision that explicitly makes speci-
fied decisions of the NAFTA tribunals final and
unreviewable.25 If NAFTA’s “transfer of a sover-
eign power of the United States” to an interna-
tional institution (p. 31) is a real problem, their
proposals would not address it. A presumption
against self-execution does not preclude such
transfers. As Ku and Yoo assert, that presumption
“just ensures that before the United States under-
takes a significant change in the nature of its inter-
national commitments, it uses the regular means
of domestic policy-making to reach a decision”
(p. 103).
Elsewhere in the book, however, Ku and Yoo
seem to endorse or assume additional constitu-
tional limits on international cooperation that
would affect U.S. participation in NAFTA and
other international institutions much more dra-
matically. They suggest that Article III, federalism
principles, the Appointments Clause, and the
nondelegation doctrine impose restrictions on the
kinds of international arrangements in which the
United States can participate and on the kinds of
implementing legislation that Congress could
approve.KuandYoo assert, for example, thatArti-
cle IIImay prohibitU.S. participation inNAFTA’s
dispute settlement system and that the Appoint-
ments Clause may render the Chemical Weapons
Convention’s enforcement provisions unconsti-
tutional (pp. 75–77).Whether andhowthese con-
stitutional requirements constrainparticipation in
international institutions is contested by scholars
and is far from resolved by the courts.26 The prac-
tical consequences of accepting such controversial
constitutional limitations, however, would be far-
reaching. Such limitations would do much more
than Ku and Yoo’s three proposals to curtail
“transfers” of “the power to control and imple-
ment international legal obligations . . . to inde-
pendent international institutions” (p. 16). But
they would do so by imperiling U.S. participation
in key international agreements. It is difficult to
believe that any functional analysis that considers
this consequence could support Ku and Yoo’s
interpretation.
Ku and Yoo are by no means alone in their
anxiety about how globalization will affect gover-
nance within the United States. But there is con-
siderable dissonance between the reassuring rhet-
oric that they use to describe their goals and the
practical consequences of accepting their propos-
als.While Ku and Yoo’s proposals may offer some
advantages, they are accompanied by significant
costs, and Ku and Yoo err in discounting them.
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24 See NAFTA, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
25 19 U.S.C. §1516a(g)(2).
26 Joinedby twoother justices, JusticeAntonin Scalia
endorsed federalism limitations in his concurring opin-
ion inBond v.United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2098–102
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also, e.g., CURTIS A.
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REV. 707 (2007).
2014] 575RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
